using alternative measures of stock liquidity. Tables IA4 -IA6 . The tables are organized as follows: Table IA1 : Robustness checks using relative quoted spread to measure liquidity Table IA2 : Robustness checks using the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio to measure liquidity Table IA3 : Robustness checks using the PIN measure to capture adverse selection component of liquidity Table IA4 : Robustness checks controlling for M&A deal size or removing firms with M&As Table IA5 : Robustness checks partitioning sample into size quartiles Table IA6 : Robustness checks interacting liquidity with time effects
Section B discusses additional results reported in

Section A. Robustness Checks Using Alternative Measures of Stock Liquidity
In this section we check to see if the results shown in Table II are robust to the use of alternative measures of stock liquidity. We obtain intraday trades and quotes from the Trade and Quote (TAQ) database and daily trading information (price and volume) from CRSP daily stock files to construct two alternative measures of liquidity: the natural logarithm of the annual relative quoted spread RQSPRD and the natural logarithm of the annual Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure AMIHUD. Relative quoted spread is the quoted spread standardized by the mid-point of the prevailing bid-ask quote, based on the same sample we use to calculate relative effective spread. The Amihud measure is calculated as the daily price response associated with one dollar of trading volume and averaged over fiscal year t for firm i. To build the sample using the Amihud measure, we require a stock to be listed at the end of its fiscal year t, to have at least 200 days of return and volume data available in the CRSP daily files during fiscal year t, and to have a price of $5 or more at the end of fiscal year t. Both liquidity measures are highly correlated with our main measure of liquidity ILLIQ: RQSPRD has a 0.99 correlation (both Pearson and Spearman) with ILLIQ, and AMIHUD has a Pearson (Spearman) correlation of 0.90 (0.91) with ILLIQ, all significant at the 1% level.
We report the results using the relative quoted spread measure and the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure in Table IA1 and IA2, respectively. As shown, the coefficient estimates of the relative quoted spread are all positive and significant at the 1% level. For example, the coefficient is 0.130 (p-value < 0.001) in model (1) of Table IA1 Microstructure literature posits that the bid-ask spread can be decomposed into inventory holding, order processing, and adverse selection components (e.g., Huang and Stoll (1997) ). Of the three components, the adverse selection component captures information asymmetry between informed and uninformed traders. Since both streams of theories underpinning our hypotheses concern information, i.e., Stein (1988 Stein ( , 1989 on information asymmetry and Maug (1998) as well as Edmans (2009) on collection and/or trading of private information, our baseline results should remain robust to using a proxy for the information-related component of the bid-ask spread (i.e., adverse selection component). We repeat Eq. (1) using the PIN (probability of informed trading) measure of Easley, Kiefer, and O'Hara (1997) . PIN is a widely used measure in prior research to capture the degree of information asymmetry among traders in the secondary market.
ii We report the results in Table IA3 in the appendix. The coefficient estimates of PIN are positive and significant at the 1% level in both panels. Increasing PIN from its median (0.205) to the 90 th percentile (0.328) is associated with approximately a 2.3% increase in the number of patents filed and a 2% increase in the number of citations received by each patent in one year.
Section B. Additional Insights
In this section we run several tests to examine if the causal effect of liquidity on innovation is being driven by a particular sub-sample of firms. First, we examine if the results are being driven by the sub-sample of firms who have relied on acquisitions to achieve innovation. We begin by identifying firms in our sample that have acquired at least 50% ownership or assets of another firm in a year. We then calculate the aggregate value of all M&As undertaken by these firms normalized by their book value of assets at the end of the year, denoted as DEALVAL, and set to zero if no majority acquisition is undertaken. In column (1) of Panels A and B in Table IA4 , we augment Eq. (1) by including DEALVAL. The coefficient estimates of ILLIQ continue to be the same magnitude as they are in Table II increase in the number of patents filed in one year (significant at 1%) for firms in the largest size quartile and a .90% increase in the number of patents filed in one year (insignificant) for firms in the smallest size quartile. The results are very similar if we partition our sample based on firm age (not shown for brevity). Overall, the subsample tests suggest that the causal relation between liquidity and innovation is not simply driven by small, young firms.
To rule out the possibility that our results are driven by a large number of firm-year observations with zero patents and citations, we focus on a subsample of firms that have at least one patent in the pooled sample. In untabulated analysis, we continue to observe positive and significant coefficient estimates on ILLIQ.
Lastly, we examine if there is a particular year or set of years that are driving the results.
To assess this, in addition to controlling for year fixed effects, we add interaction terms between ILLIQ and year dummies to Eq. (1) and report the results in of interaction terms are all positive and become significant starting 1998, suggesting that the negative relation between liquidity and innovation is unchanged (compared to 1994) in the period of 1995 to 1997, but become stronger starting in 1998. One possible explanation is that the shift of the minimum tick size in 1997 from the eighth regime to the sixteenth regime enhanced stock liquidity. Also, an interesting observation is that the magnitudes of the interaction terms increase monotonically after 1998, suggesting that the negative relation between liquidity and innovation has strengthened with liquidity increasing in the past decade.
In summary, in this section we show the negative relation between stock liquidity and firm innovation is not being driven by firms acquiring or merging with other firms, is not being driven by small cap firms, is not being driven by firms with zero R&D or patents, and is strengthening over time. (1), DEALVAL is the deal value (in millions) of the M&A deflated by end of the year book value of assets. DEALVAL is included as an additional control variable if there is an acquisition that involves 50% or more in another firm for a firm-year and set to zero otherwise. In column (2), we delete a firm-year if the firm acquires 50% of more in another firm. In column (3), we delete a firm-year if the firm acquires 50% or more in another firm or 50% or more of the firm is acquired by another firm. Coefficient estimates are shown in bold and their standard errors are clustered by firm and displayed in parentheses below. 
